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CHILD PROTECTION LAW—CARE AND PROTECTION 
OF WALT: REEXAMINING THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL 
AUTHORITY IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE REASONABLE 
EFFORTS REQUIREMENT 
Tara Morrison 
When the state removes a child from the custody of his or her parents, 
the delicate balance between parents’ rights and the state’s obligation to 
protect the child comes into play.  Because termination of parental rights 
is irrevocable, it is often referred to as the “death penalty” of family law.  
Historically, parents with intellectual disabilities have been denied the 
opportunity to parent through eugenics and sterilization, a horrific 
history that finds modern articulation through the removal of children 
from parents based on presumptions of neglect.1  When a child protection 
agency removes a child from parental care, without providing the 
support services to remedy the stated reason for removal, the parents are 
denied an adequate opportunity to parent their own children and the 
family suffers.  In 2017, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
decided Care and Protection of Walt, which held that if the Department 
of Children and Families (DCF) breaches its statutory duty to provide 
support services prior to removing a child, then the juvenile judge has 
the equitable authority to order remedial action.  This Note discusses 
what Walt tells us about how and when judicial authority may be 
exercised in care and protection cases in Massachusetts, and what 
impact this may have on parental rights, specifically the rights of parents 
with intellectual disabilities. 
INTRODUCTION 
The right to parent one’s own child is a constitutionally protected 
private interest and therefore no state interference is permitted without due 
                                                 
1. Tim Booth & Wendy Booth, Parenting with Learning Difficulties: Lessons for 
Practitioners, 23 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 459, 463 (1993). 
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process of law.2  However, under the doctrine of parens patriae3 the state 
may take custody of children who are considered to be experiencing, or at 
imminent risk of experiencing, abuse or neglect.4  During the 1970s, the 
number of children in foster care in the United States ballooned from 
approximately 8,000 to 100,000,5 and one response to this increase was to 
refocus state efforts on reunification of the family by providing increased 
funding for support services.6  This shift also recognized that prolonged 
placement in a foster home can have a profoundly negative impact on 
children.7   
In an attempt to focus efforts on keeping children in their homes, the 
federal government implemented the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), which encouraged a shift away from 
child removal and toward providing alternative services to families.8  
Among other requirements, the AACWA includes a “reasonable efforts 
requirement,”9 which mandates that in order to receive certain federal 
funding for foster care, states must alter their statutory schemes to include 
a requirement that child protection agencies make efforts to reunify the 
family.10  This requirement is meant to protect parents and children from 
                                                 
2. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); In re Hilary, 880 N.E.2d 343, 347–
48 (Mass. 2008); Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406, 407–08 (Mass. 1979). 
3. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
4. The specifics of the statutory schemes empowering state agencies to remove children 
vary from state to state.  In Massachusetts, the predominant statutes governing care and 
protection proceedings are MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 119 (2019) and MASS GEN. LAWS. ch. 210 
(2019). 
5. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., OVERVIEW OF 
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1994 GREEN BOOK, H.R. Doc. No. 103-27, at 639 tbl.14-14 (1994). 
6. See S. REP. NO. 96-336, at 3–4 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1452–
53. 
7. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST 
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 19–20, 90 (1996); CAROLE A. MCKELVEY & JOELLEN STEVENS, 
ADOPTION CRISIS: THE TRUTH BEHIND ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE 36–37 (1994); Paul Fine, 
Clinical Aspects of Foster Care, in FOSTER CARE: CURRENT ISSUES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 
206, 206–08 (Martha J. Cox & Roger D. Cox eds., 1985); Shawn L. Raymond, Where Are the 
Reasonable Efforts to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts Requirement?: Monitoring State 
Compliance Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
1235, 1236 n.5 (1999). 
8. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  The provision of the reasonable efforts 
requirement was preserved when Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act in 1997.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2009). 
9. This requirement will be referred to throughout this Note as the “reasonable efforts 
requirement.” 
10. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(1), (a)(15)(B) (2019) (“[R]easonable effort shall be made to 
preserve and reunify families (i) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removing the child from the child’s home; and (ii) to make it possible for 
a child to safely return to the child’s home . . . .”). 
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avoidable removal and prolonged separation.11  Congress adjusted the 
requirement through the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
(ASFA),12 which allows for child welfare agencies to remove children 
from their homes without first taking reasonable efforts to prevent the 
removal in circumstances where the child is living in a highly dangerous 
home.13 
While the reasonable efforts requirement has been included in the 
Massachusetts child welfare statute,14 there is very little federal guidance 
about what exactly the state must do to satisfy the requirement.15  
Therefore, the requirement has gone largely unenforced.16  This lack of 
                                                 
11. Karoline S. Homer, Program Abuse in Foster Care: A Search for Solutions, 1 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 177, 180 (1993). 
12. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
13. Id.  Section 671(a)(15)(D) amended the ASFA by adding exceptions to the reasonable 
efforts requirement: reasonable efforts need not be made prior to removal of a child or to reunify 
the child with their parent if 
the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State 
law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, 
chronic abuse, and sexual abuse); the parent has committed murder . . . of another 
child of the parent; committed voluntary manslaughter . . . of another child of the 
parent; aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such murder 
or such a voluntary manslaughter; or committed a felony assault that results in 
serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(ii) (2019). 
14. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 119, §§ 24, 29C (2019).  In codifying 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) 
into state law, Massachusetts included the requirement that once a child has been removed, the 
judge “shall determine not less than annually whether the department or its agent has made 
reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to his parent or guardian,” 
which established a timeline for judicial determination of whether reunification efforts are being 
made once the child has been placed in the custody of DCF.  Id.  Additionally, Massachusetts 
has included the reasonable efforts obligation in the factors that the court must consider when 
deciding to terminate parental rights.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(b) (2019). 
15. Cristine H. Kim, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in 
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 299 (“While the HHS regulations 
require that each state designate in a plan which preventive and reunification services are 
available, no state is required to provide any specific services.” (footnote omitted)); see Will L. 
Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under Federal Child 
Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 313 (2003).  “In short, while the law outlines 
when states do not have to undertake reasonable efforts, it does not articulate a definition of the 
types of reasonable efforts state child welfare officials should undertake and state youth court 
judges should consider in the judicial determination process.”  Raymond, supra note 7, at 1260.  
“In effect, inaction on the part of [Health and Human Services] [to define reasonable efforts] 
has created a situation in which the federal government’s foster care ‘contract’ with states 
amounts to only empty ‘conditions.’”  Id. at 1262. 
16. See Jeanne M. Kaiser, Finding a Reasonable Way to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts 
Requirement in Child Protection Cases, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 111 (2009) 
(“Massachusetts serves as one example of a state in which judicial enforcement of the 
reasonable efforts requirement has been forgiving of uninspired state efforts.  . . . Massachusetts 
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enforcement is extremely harmful to families living in poverty, parents 
who are drug addicted, and parents with intellectual disabilities, for 
example, because concerns about their ability to provide adequate care 
could potentially be alleviated by support services from the Department 
of Children and Families (DCF or the Department).17  Without meaningful 
enforcement of the reasonable efforts requirement, there is no guarantee 
that these parents will receive services from DCF that could be essential 
to reunification, such as the support of a parent aide, home-making 
services, and sufficient visitation time.  At several stages of a care and 
protection litigation, the court must determine whether or not DCF has 
taken reasonable efforts to provide supportive services.  However, the 
level of deference to be afforded to the state agency in determining 
whether reasonable efforts were made, as well as the scope of the court’s 
authority to order services when DCF has failed to meet their reasonable 
efforts obligation, remains unclear.18 
In 2017, Care and Protection of Walt addressed these very issues.19  
In Walt, the child was removed from the home due to allegations of 
neglect based on DCF’s concerns about the cleanliness of the home and 
the parents’ suspected use of marijuana around the child.20  The trial judge 
approved the emergency removal at the initial hearing and transferred 
permanent custody to DCF at the temporary custody hearing.21  The father 
then petitioned for interlocutory relief, and eventually the case made its 
way in front of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).22  The 
court concluded that a juvenile judge has the authority to order DCF “to 
                                                 
appellate courts have set the bar for complying with the reasonable efforts requirement quite 
low . . . .”). 
17. Infra Section I. 
18. See Ann Balmelli O’Connor, Care and Protection of Walt: Breathing New Life Into 
the Decades-Old Policy of Foster Care as a Last Resort, 62 BOS. B.J. 24, 24 (2018). 
19. See Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803 (Mass. 2017). 
20. Id. at 807–08. 
21. Id. at 810. 
22. After the father petitioned for interlocutory relief, the petition went to a single justice 
of the Appeals Court, who found that “[t]he [d]epartment did not make reasonable efforts to 
eliminate the need for removal prior to removing [Walt]; rather, it summarily removed the child 
from the premises.”  Id. (alterations in original).  In addition to remanding the case for a further 
hearing on what reasonable efforts DCF would provide to eliminate the need for removal, the 
court also ordered specific services be provided to the family, including daily visitation, 
inclusion in the child’s special education meetings, and assistance with finding alternative 
housing.  Id. at 810–11. The single justice reported his order to a panel of the Appeals Court 
and the SJC transferred the case on its own motion.  Id. at 811. 
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take reasonable remedial steps to diminish the adverse consequences of 
its breach of duty.”23 
This Note addresses how Walt impacted the availability of 
enforcement of the reasonable efforts requirement, particularly focusing 
on parents with intellectual disabilities as a case study for the crucial 
importance of this statutory obligation.  Part I examines the current 
protections in place for parents and the lack of an effective remedy for 
parents who are not receiving the services to which they are entitled under 
both state law and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).24  This 
deprivation of parental rights is a serious concern under Massachusetts 
law because children can be removed on account of a parent’s disability 
despite the fact that there is no meaningful remedy for a parent whose 
disability is not being accounted for in the services provided.  Part II 
explains how two Massachusetts cases previously established the extent 
of judicial authority to interfere with decisions made by DCF and 
examines those cases in detail to better understand judicial deference in 
the context of child protection law in Massachusetts. 
Part III argues that Walt can be read to expand the authority of 
juvenile judges to intervene when DCF has failed to make reasonable 
efforts towards reunification, including reasonable accommodations for 
parents with disabilities.  In conclusion, this Note explores how this 
reading would provide a necessary check on DCF’s power to define its 
own statutory obligation—a necessary protection for parents with 
disabilities. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REASONABLE EFFORTS REQUIREMENT IN 
BALANCING THE PROTECTION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND THE 
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN 
Child protective agencies were originally created to provide safety 
and protection for children experiencing abuse or neglect.25  The federal 
                                                 
23. Id. at 817 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 59, for the Juvenile Court’s equitable 
jurisdiction in all cases and matters arising under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119). 
24. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2009).  Title II of the 
ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in all programs, 
activities, and services provided by public entities.  42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018).  The ADA was 
amended in 2008 to “restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990,” an amendment that substantially redefined the definition of disability.  See ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
25. The world’s first organization devoted entirely to child protection was the New York 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, established in 1875.  John E.B. Meyers, A 
Short History of Child Protection in America, 42 FAM. L.Q. 449, 449 (2008).  Henry Bergh, 
founder of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and his attorney, 
Elbridge Gerry, established the organization when Etta Wheeler, who was desperate to find a 
legal mechanism to protect a young girl who she knew was being routinely beaten, contacted 
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and state statutes that govern care and protection proceedings attempt to 
balance the interests of parents and the interests of the state, a challenging 
task as these protected interests can sometimes be in conflict.26  While the 
Supreme Court has recognized that parents have a constitutionally 
protected interest in retaining custody of their children,27 the state also has 
the parens patriae power to protect the welfare and safety of children and 
to promote their best interests.28  While leniency in child removal cases 
may result in catastrophic tragedy, an over-zealous approach means that 
children who could have safely lived with their parents are placed in foster 
care and potentially adopted, unjustly denying the rights of both children 
and parents to live together as a family.29  Studies show that for children, 
the experience of being removed from their family can be intensely 
traumatic, and the effects of removal can be lifelong.30 
With these concerns in mind, federal and state legislatures have 
implemented a reunification-promoting policy in the form of the 
reasonable efforts requirement.31  This requirement, in essence, is meant 
to establish that DCF will first and foremost try to put energy and 
resources into keeping families together.  The goal of the 
Commonwealth—to support families and to avoid child removal unless 
absolutely necessary—is articulated in the Massachusetts child-welfare 
statute policy declaration, which states that the Commonwealth will: 
direct its efforts, first, to the strengthening and encouragement of 
family life for the care and protection of children; to assist and 
encourage the use by any family of all available resources to this end; 
and to provide substitute care of children only when the family itself 
                                                 
them seeking help saving the child.  Id. at 451–52.  By 1922, there were over three hundred 
child protective agencies throughout the country, but throughout the twentieth century, many 
cities and rural areas alike had no access to child protection services.  Id. at 452. 
26. See Michele N. Jabour, The Termination of Parental Rights by Massachusetts Courts, 
23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 547, 548 (1988); see also Toby Solomon & James B. Boskey, In Whose 
Best Interests: Child v. Parent, 1993 N.J. LAW. 36, 36 (“Protecting the child’s interest is more 
difficult in cases where the parent’s interests are at odds with the child’s.  The clearest example 
of this arises in cases of termination of parental rights . . . .”). 
27. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (finding that parents have essential rights 
to conceive and raise children). 
28. Jabour, supra note 26, at 550; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
29. See Michelle Goldberg, Has Child Protective Services Gone Too Far?, THE NATION 
(Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/has-child-protective-services-gone-too-far/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y7EG-8DS4] (highlighting the discrepancies within the child welfare system 
between white middle class parents, poor parents, and parents of color when it comes to 
monitoring and intervention by child services). 
30. Delilah Bruskas, Children in Foster Care: A Vulnerable Population at Risk, 21 J. 
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 70, 70–71 (2008). 
31. Supra notes 8, 10, 13 and accompanying text. 
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or the resources available to the family are unable to provide the 
necessary care and protection to insure the rights of any child to sound 
health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral 
development.32 
The reasonable efforts requirement is a mechanism for ensuring that 
children are not removed from the care of their parents when the 
circumstances that caused the agency to investigate the family could be 
alleviated by providing services to the parents.33  In this way, parents are 
not robbed of the opportunity to parent their children in a safe and healthy 
environment and are provided the resources they need to care for their 
family.34 
A. Procedural Due Process and Care and Protection in Massachusetts 
Understanding where the reasonable efforts requirement comes into 
play in a care and protection proceeding requires a bit of background into 
how this particular area of litigation operates.  Care and protection 
proceedings fall under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and 
throughout the litigation process—from the moment a report of neglect or 
abuse is filed to the termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing—there 
are procedural safeguards to which DCF must adhere.35  These safeguards 
exist because, as a state agency potentially depriving citizens of a 
protected interest, there are significant due process concerns as soon as a 
                                                 
32. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 1 (2019). 
33. See Amelia S. Watson, A New Focus on Reasonable Efforts to Reunify, ABA (Sept. 1, 
2012), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/
child_law_practice/vol_31/september_2012/a_new_focus_on_reasonableeffortstoreunify/ 
[https://perma.cc/LV7D-BGT7].  This article emphasizes how there is a new focus on 
enforceability of the reasonable efforts requirement in the wake of the current economic climate 
and defines reasonable efforts enforcement as ensuring “states offer preventative and 
rehabilitative services to parents involved with the child welfare agency.”  Id.  “The question is 
pronounced since child welfare cases typically involve poor parents and families who cannot 
afford services without state agency support.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
34. Mical Raz, Family Separation Doesn’t Just Happen at the Border: Poor Families, 
Too, Are Torn Apart by Policy that Favors Separation Over Aid, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2019, 
6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/30/family-separation-doesnt-
just-happen-border/ [https://perma.cc/5VK6-C6NS] (“Rather than providing struggling families 
with the resources they need to make both parents[’] and children’s lives safer, family separation 
is all too often the penalty parents pay for poverty, addiction or disability.”). 
35. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019); see Leonard P. Edwards, Judicial Oversight 
of Parental Visitation in Family Reunification Cases, 54 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 2 (2003). 
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51A report36 is filed.37  The SJC’s “decisions, and those of the United 
States Supreme Court, leave no doubt that ‘[t]he rights to conceive and to 
raise one’s children’ are ‘essential . . . basic civil rights of man . . . far 
more precious . . . than property rights.’”38  Parents and children have a 
right to be together and to be afforded the procedural due process 
guarantees associated with that right.39 
In Massachusetts, every care and protection proceeding begins with 
a report of abuse or neglect, which then triggers an investigation of the 
family by DCF.  Once the DCF investigator substantiates the report of 
abuse or neglect, there are two ways in which a child can come into the 
custody of DCF: either a temporary custody hearing is scheduled or the 
child is taken into emergency custody, and a temporary custody hearing 
is scheduled.  DCF is permitted to take emergency custody of a child if 
the DCF investigator finds that the child is currently experiencing abuse 
or neglect or is at imminent risk of abuse or neglect and the removal of 
the child is deemed necessary to protect the safety of the child.40  First, the 
DCF worker must make a written report stating the reasons for removal 
and file a care and protection petition on the next court day.41  Next, the 
judge must find at an ex parte hearing that DCF had reasonable cause to 
believe that the child is suffering from serious abuse or neglect, or is in 
immediate danger of such, and that immediate removal is necessary to 
protect the child from abuse or neglect.42  Only then may the court issue 
an emergency order transferring the child into the custody of DCF for up 
                                                 
36. A 51A report is a report filed against a parent or guardian when there is a suspicion of 
abuse or neglect.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2019).  The 51A report is often the first 
contact a family will have with DCF.  After receiving a 51A report, the Department “shall 
investigate the suspected child abuse or neglect, provide a written evaluation . . . and make a 
written determination relative to the safety of and risk posed to the child and whether the 
suspected child abuse or neglect is substantiated.”  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51B(a) (2019). 
37. Care & Prot. of Erin, 823 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Mass. 2005) (“Due process requirements 
must be met where a parent is deprived of the right to raise his or her child.” (citation omitted)); 
Raymond C. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, 2013 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1029, 1032 (“[U]nless the parent consents to termination of parental rights, the parent 
retains a right under the United States Constitution to the custody of his or her child.  This right 
is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and is a fundamental right.”).  
See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650–51 (1972) (discussing the right of parents 
to raise their children). 
38. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E. 2d 406, 407 (Mass. 1979) (quoting Stanley, 
405 U.S. at 651). 
39. See In re Hilary, 880 N.E.2d 343, 347–48 (Mass. 2008) (“[P]arents have a 
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.”). 
40. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.29 (2019). 
41. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51B(c) (2019). 
42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 24 (2019). 
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to seventy-two hours.43  In Massachusetts, indigent parents are provided 
with an attorney and are entitled to a temporary custody hearing, 
commonly referred to as a “seventy-two hour hearing,” where they may 
present their case.44 
When there is no emergency removal, the case first goes to court at 
the temporary custody hearing.  At the temporary custody hearing, the 
juvenile judge must decide whether continuation in DCF’s custody is in 
the best interest of the child, and whether DCF made reasonable efforts to 
prevent the necessity of removal.45  Once the child is placed in DCF 
custody, DCF then has a statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts 
“to make it possible for the child to return safely to his parent or 
guardian”46 in the form of a service plan for the family.47  Once the child 
is in the permanent custody of DCF, the parties must routinely return to 
court throughout the duration of the case, and the judge must decide no 
less than annually whether reasonable efforts have been made by the DCF 
to reunify the family.48  The fact that the reasonable efforts determination 
is made by a judge, rather than being left for DCF to decide independently, 
highlights the vital importance that this obligation be honored. 
B. The Particular Importance of Enforcing the Reasonable Efforts 
Requirement for Parents with Intellectual Disabilities 
To illustrate how critical it is that parents receive the support services 
towards reunification to which they are entitled, this Part of the Note 
focuses on the experience of state intervention for parents with intellectual 
disabilities.  The issues identified are also extremely relevant to parents 
living in poverty or struggling with addiction, and it is clear that judicial 
enforcement of the reasonable efforts requirement would directly and 
substantially impact the lives of these parents as well.  However, a recent 
federal investigation into one Massachusetts mother’s case provides a 
particularly helpful illustration of how the lack of enforceable reasonable 
efforts requirement impacts the lives for parents with intellectual 
disabilities, and that is the reasoning behind this Note’s focus on this 
                                                 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019). 
46. Id. 
47. Id.; see also 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.001–7.095 (2019).  While the DCF regulations 
include a litany of subsections addressing various service options for families, the current 
regulations are devoid of protocols for how families can access such services, nor any definition 
or description of the “service plan” or “action plan” that DCF must provide each family. 
48. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019). 
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particular issue as a case study for the enforcement of the reasonable 
efforts requirement.  
1. Sara Gordon 
A recent joint investigation of DCF conducted by the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and Department of Health and Human Services (HSS)49 
highlights the tragic ramifications of lack of oversight with regards to the 
reasonable efforts requirement.  Sara Gordon50 prompted the investigation 
after spending over two years separated from her infant daughter based on 
DCF’s belief that her disabilities made her unfit to parent.51  The findings 
of the investigation, documented in the joint report, brought to light the 
services available to parents, and the importance of a mechanism to ensure 
that those supports are provided.52 
Sara was a young Massachusetts mother whose child was removed 
from her care just days after she gave birth because a nurse was concerned 
that she did not know how to properly care for her child.53  Sara had a 
developmental disability that manifested in several ways and caused her 
to require “repetition, hands-on instruction, and frequency in order to learn 
new things.”54  Over the next two years Sara received “minimum 
supports” from DCF, and despite Sara’s continuous pleas for more time 
with her daughter, she was able to visit with her only two to four hours 
per month.55  Eventually, DCF decided that it would be in the child’s best 
                                                 
49. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Just., Civ. Rights Div. & U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 
Servs., Office for Civil Rights, to Erin Deveney, Interim Comm’r, Mass. Dep’t of Children & 
Families (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.ada.gov/ma_docf_lof.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP6R-36DE] 
[hereinafter DOJ & HSS Letter].  This joint letter, issued following the Departments’ 
investigation into alleged disability discrimination by DCF, marks a historic moment in 
disability law because it represents the first time that the federal government has officially 
interpreted the twenty-five-year-old Americans with Disabilities Act as it applies to the 
protection of parental rights.  Elizabeth Picciuto, Baby Taken Away Because Mom’s 
“Disabled”, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:55 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/baby-
taken-away-because-moms-disabled [https://perma.cc/U54K-73EW].  Robyn Powell, a lawyer 
with the National Council on Disability, said about the report, the “DOJ and HHS’s letter is 
really significant because it’s the first time they’ve said what we’ve all thought, which is that 
the ADA applies to these matters.  They are saying, yes, parents have the right to have the 
appropriate supports and not have their child removed arbitrarily.”  Id. 
50. “Sara Gordon” is the pseudonym used by the DOJ and HSS throughout the joint report.  
DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 1. 
51. Id. at 12–13. 
52. Id. at 11–12. 
53. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 5.  The Intake Report indicated that DCF decided 
to conduct an emergency response investigation, noting concerns that Sara was “not able to 
comprehend how to handle or care for the child due to the [her] mental retardation.”  Id. (citing 
the 51A report). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 6. 
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interest to change the goal from reunification to adoption,56 the step 
preceding termination of parental rights. 
The report found that DCF had services at its disposal that could have 
helped Sara, but DCF failed to provide them.57  The report also concluded 
that DCF’s failure to provide these services violated Title II of the ADA.58  
This violation denied Sara access to existing family resources and in-home 
parenting services.  Moreover, the report states that DCF administered its 
program in a way that had the “purpose or effect of defeating or 
substantially impairing accomplishment of the reunification program 
objectives with respect to Ms. Gordon.”59  Sara and her daughter were 
reunited following this investigation,60 but had the DOJ and HSS not 
become involved in Sara’s case, it is highly likely that her parental rights 
would have been terminated.  Sadly, Sara is certainly not alone in her 
experience, as parents with intellectual disabilities routinely experience 
this kind of disability discrimination at alarming rates. 
2. The High Risk of Termination of Parental Rights for Parents 
with Intellectual Disabilities 
For parents with intellectual disabilities, there are several factors that 
increase the likelihood that DCF will remove their child and terminate 
their parental rights.61  First, cases where children are removed due to fear 
that the parent lacks the ability to care for the child tend to involve actual 
or potential neglect rather than abuse.62  Following the definition of 
neglect,63 this means that in order to alleviate the precipitating condition, 
                                                 
56. Id. at 12. 
57. Id. at 14. 
58. Id. at 12. 
59. Id. at 17. 
60. Susan Donaldson James, “We Can Keep Her”: Disabled Mom Wins Daughter Back 
After Legal Battle, TODAY (Mar. 13, 2015, 3:59 PM), https://www.today.com/parents/disabled-
mom-gets-daughter-back-after-legal-battle-t8511 [https://perma.cc/3KVA-3S5C]. 
61. See Jude T. Pannell, Unaccommodated: Parents with Mental Disabilities in Iowa’s 
Child Welfare System and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 1165, 1171 
(2011); Rachel N. Shute, Disabling the Presumption of Unfitness: Utilizing the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to Equally Protect Massachusetts Parents Facing Termination of Their 
Parental Rights, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 493, 494 (2017) (“The stigma surrounding mental 
illness blinds many who are involved with the care and protection of children, making parents 
with disabilities more likely to become involved with the child welfare system and face 
termination of their parental rights.”). 
62. Maurice A. Feldman, Parents with Intellectual Disabilities: Implications and 
Interventions, in HANDBOOK OF CHILD ABUSE RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 401, 401 (John R. 
Lutzker ed., 1998). 
63. According to DCF regulations, neglect is defined as: 
failure by a caretaker, either deliberately or through negligence or inability, to take 
those actions necessary to provide a child with minimally adequate food, clothing, 
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the parents must obtain new skills, rather than desist an abusive 
behavior.64  The success of these parents becomes highly dependent on the 
availability of services because of the requirement that they have new skill 
development.65  Unfortunately, parents with disabilities are less likely to 
have access to these very services because they are more apt to be living 
in poverty than parents without disabilities.66  Additionally, parents with 
disabilities are more likely to receive state services, meaning they are 
subject to frequent monitoring by professionals who are mandated 
reporters, increasing their likelihood of referral to DCF.67  High rates of 
referral to DCF are also the result of presumptions about the aptitude of 
parents with disabilities to provide adequate care.68  Parents with 
disabilities are often referred to child welfare services and, once involved, 
experience permanent separation at a much higher rate than the general 
population.69  Additionally, the “relative lack of appropriate family 
                                                 
shelter, medical care, supervision, emotional stability and growth, or other 
essential care; provided, however, that such inability is not due solely to inadequate 
economic resources or solely to the existence of a handicapping condition. 
110 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.00 (2019).  The very decision to remove the child from Sara’s care 
on account of her disabilities went against DCF regulations, as the concerns arose directly from 
her disability, or “handicapping condition.”  DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 2, 23–24 
(noting that in Massachusetts DCF has no procedures for social workers to implement or 
understand how this portion of the regulations applies to their obligations to families in order to 
avoid discrimination). 
64. The definition of abuse according to DCF regulations is “the non-accidental 
commission of any act by a caretaker upon a child under age 18 which causes, or creates a 
substantial risk of physical or emotional injury, or constitutes a sexual offense under the laws 
of the Commonwealth or any sexual contact between a caretaker and a child under the care of 
that individual,” while the definition of neglect is the “failure by a caretaker, either deliberately 
or through negligence or inability, to take those actions necessary to provide a child with 
minimally adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, supervision, emotional stability and 
growth, or other essential care . . . .”  110 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.00 (2019). 
65. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF 
PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 193–215 (2012) [hereinafter ROCKING THE 
CRADLE], https://www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/NCD_Parenting_508_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E7NA-GHJB]. 
66. Rhoda Olkin et al., Comparison of Parents with and Without Disabilities Raising 
Teens: Information from the NHIS and Two National Surveys, 51 REHABILITATION PSYCHOL. 
43, 44 (2006). 
67. MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH 
MENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 20 (1999); Susan Kerr, The 
Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Termination of the Parental Rights of 
Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 387, 402 (2000). 
68. Michael J. Gassner, In Search of a Friend: Custody Hearings and the Disabled Parent, 
5 JUV. L. 35, 35–36 (1981) (“The probability of a poor decision is exacerbated when the 
stigmatizing ‘disability’ of a parent is inserted into the facts.”).  
69. ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 65, at 14, 18; PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF 
PARENTS AND PROSPECTIVE PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR 
STATE AND LOCAL CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES AND COURTS UNDER TITLE II OF THE 
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services to address the needs of parents with disabilities and their children, 
and the short time frames of child protection proceedings . . . make these 
cases relatively likely to go to court and end in termination of parental 
rights.”70  Massachusetts is one of the thirty-seven states that actually 
allows for parents to be found permanently unfit to care for their children 
on account of their disabilities.71  Nationally, removal rates for parents 
with intellectual disabilities are as high as eighty percent.72  For parents 
with disabilities in Massachusetts, the DCF rules and regulations have 
incorporated the ADA requirements by stating that the agency must 
provide adequate accommodations to parents with disabilities.73  The 
ADA74 and the Rehabilitation Act75 also both include “a prohibition on 
making child custody decisions on the basis of generalized assumptions 
about disability, relegating parents with disabilities to lesser services and 
opportunities, imposing over protective or unnecessarily restrictive rules, 
and failing to reasonably modify policies, practices and procedures.”76  In 
Sara Gordon’s case, the DOJ and HSS applied the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to the lack of implication of services by DCF.77  The two 
agencies found that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts by not 
                                                 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT, 
https://www.ada.gov/doj_hhs_ta/child_welfare_ta.html [https://perma.cc/RMK9-GEZN]. 
70. Joshua B. Kay, Child Welfare Cases Involving Parents with Disabilities, ST. BAR OF 
MICH.: DISABILITIES PROJECT NEWSL (Sept. 2013), https://www.michbar.org/
programs/disabilitynews/disabilities_news_28 [https://perma.cc/U58A-XGJT].  See also 
Theresa Glennon, Walking with Them: Advocating for Parents with Mental Illness in the Child 
Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 273, 291 (2003); Robert L. Hayman, Jr., 
Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1201, 1211 (1990). 
71. Joan Vennochi, Disability Does Not Preclude Parental Rights, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 12, 
2015, 1:25 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/02/12/disability-does-not-
preclude-parenthood/KGVyJ13ten3LcSN7YVXTaM/story.html [https://perma.cc/X7ZP-
K3ML]. 
72. Id.; Ella Callow et al., Parents with Disabilities in the United States: Prevalence, 
Perspectives, and a Proposal for Legislative Change to Protect the Right to Family in the 
Disability Community, 17 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 9, 15 (2011). 
73. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.08 (2019). 
The Department recognizes the special needs or handicapped clients.  The 
Department shall make reasonable accommodations to ensure that its services, 
facilities, communications, and meetings are accessible to all handicapped 
persons.  . . . The Department shall be responsive to issues of handicapping 
conditions by utilizing social workers who are attuned to the special needs of 
handicapped persons. 
Id. 
74. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2009). 
75. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2016).  The Rehabilitation Act extends the nondiscrimination 
requirements of the ADA to all “programs and activities” that receive federal funding.  Id. 
76. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)). 
77. Id. at 11–12. 
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implementing appropriate reunification services, failing to identify an 
appropriate service plan, and then making no effort to assist the mother 
with the service plan tasks required of her in order to achieve 
reunification.78  Furthermore, they found that DCF did not provide 
meaningful visitation for Sara and her daughter or the opportunity for her 
to enhance her parenting skills, and it did not follow the obligation to 
impose only necessary and legitimate safety requirements.79  These 
requirements were not met despite Sara and her attorney repeatedly and 
persistently advocating for more visitation.80  Part of the struggle lies in 
the fact that there is no real way for parents like Sara to ensure that these 
requirements are being met by DCF due to the ambiguity of the term 
“reasonable.”81  Furthermore, even if the court were to find that DCF had 
failed to make reasonable efforts and accommodations, it has been unclear 
how much power the juvenile judge has to demand that such services be 
provided before a parent’s rights can be terminated. 
However, there is not a complete lack of direction as to what 
reasonable accommodations or services DCF may provide for parents 
with intellectual disabilities.  DCF’s placement policy identifies a number 
of reasonable efforts that can be taken to prevent out-of-home placement, 
specifically meant to provide parenting assistance to “compensate for 
deficits, if problem is due to primary caretaker’s lack of certain capacities 
due to mental retardation, mental or physical illness.”82  These identified 
reunification services include “a spectrum of services that supports 
maintenance of the family unit, and enables adults or children to meet the 
goals of a service plan.”83  The DOJ and HHS investigation points out that 
Sara was directly in the target population for such services, as they are 
intended for “parents, expectant parents, or primary caregivers whose 
families are at the risk of or are currently experiencing problems with child 
abuse or neglect, which may include situations of . . . [r]isk due to 
                                                 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 6. 
81. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 360 (1992) (“How the State was to comply with 
[the reasonable efforts] directive . . . was, within broad limits, left up to the State.”).  The 
Supreme Court also found that there is no private right of action to enforce the reasonable efforts 
requirement.  Id. at 364.  Finally, while the threatened outcome of a state’s failure to comply 
with the reasonable efforts requirement is loss of federal funding to their child protection 
programs, this denial has rarely occurred.  Kaiser, supra note 16, at 110 (“The combination of 
these factors means that state can essentially enforce the reasonable efforts requirement as 
rigorously or as loosely as they see fit.”). 
82. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 16 (citing 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.061) (2015). 
83. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.030 (2019). 
 
2020] CARE AND PROTECTION OF WALT 141 
physical, developmental and/or emotional disability.”84  Yet Sara was not 
provided with the aid that was particularly designed to support parents in 
her position because, while these regulations exist, there is yet to be a 
meaningful way for parents to ensure that they are implemented. 
One service that is arguably the most essential to all parents, and 
particularly important for parents with intellectual disabilities, is the 
coordination of visitation time.  Parents’ ability to access their child, 
otherwise known as “visitation,” is a part of the parents’ service plan and 
a core concern of both the court and the parents in care and protection 
proceedings.  The first reason for this is that the maintenance of the 
parent/child bond calls directly into question the best interest of the 
child.85  Because parents like Sara, whose children are removed on 
account of an alleged failure to provide adequate care, are being evaluated 
on their ability to acquire these skills, visitation time is particularly vital 
for learning parenting skills.86  The American Bar Association has 
recommended that child welfare agencies implement daily visits for 
parents and infants because “physical proximity with the caregiver is 
central to the attachment process.”87  For parents with intellectual 
disabilities, having access to their child is of particular importance.88 
“Meaningful visitation” was one of the reunification services that the 
DOJ and HSS found DCF failed to provide to Sara.89  Specifically, they 
found that DCF failed to afford her the opportunity for “frequent, 
meaningful visitation with support to learn appropriate care for her 
daughter and to address the agency’s concerns.”90  The once-a-week 
                                                 
84. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.061 (2019). 
85. L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate & Family Court Dep’t, 49 N.E.3d 230, 239 (Mass. 
2016). 
[B]eing physically present in a child’s life, sharing time and experiences, and 
providing personal support are among the most intimate aspects of a parent-child 
relationship. For a parent who has lost (or willingly yielded) custody of a child 
temporarily to a guardian, visitation can be especially critical because it provides 
an opportunity to maintain a physical, emotional, and psychological bond with the 
child during the guardianship period, if that is in the child’s best interest . . . . 
Id. 
86. “[I]n cases where the parent aspires to regain custody at some point, it provides an 
opportunity to demonstrate the ability to properly care for the child.”  Id. 
87. DOJ and HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 20 n.19.  “The ABA similarly recommends 
that visits occur in the least restrictive, most natural setting while ensuring the safety and well-
being of the child.”  Id. 
88. See id. at 20 (emphasizing that by denying Sara frequent and meaningful visitation 
time with her daughter, DCF failed to provide services that acknowledged the importance of 
“repetition, hands-on instruction, and frequency” to Sara’s ability to learn new skills). 
89. Id. at 18. 
90. Id. at 20. 
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visitation plan was implemented and continued, despite recommendation 
for increased visitation from the contracted agency providing Sara with 
parenting classes, the psychologist who conducted her parenting 
assessment, and Sara herself.91  Walt also recognizes both the value and 
critical importance of parenting time, and the authority of the court to 
make orders regarding visitation in service of the child’s best interest.92 
D. Without Judicial Enforcement, There are Limited Ways to 
Challenge the Reunification Services DCF is Providing 
A pertinent flaw in the reasonable efforts requirement, and a further 
reason that the decision in Walt is so vital to protecting parental rights, is 
that there are extremely limited ways to enforce the reasonable efforts 
requirement.  The fact that the requirement exists in Massachusetts law 
does not in and of itself mean that it is followed.93 
The finding that DCF has failed to make reasonable efforts lacks 
meaning at a termination of parental rights hearing because even if a judge 
concludes that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts, the judge has the 
authority to rule that removal is in the child’s best interest if the judge 
finds the parent to be permanently unfit.94  The only time that a lack of 
reasonable efforts finding may hold weight at a termination hearing is on 
the rare occasion the judge determines that the failure to provide services 
makes it impossible to determine that a parent is permanently unfit.95 
For a child to be removed from his or her parents on account of the 
parents’ intellectual disabilities the court must find permanent unfitness 
by clear and convincing evidence—temporary unfitness is insufficient.96  
                                                 
91. Id. at 7–8. 
92. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 818–19 (Mass. 2017). 
93. Crossley, supra note 15 (finding that, in fact, it is rare that federal funding is withheld 
due to a failure to comply with the reasonable efforts requirement, leaving it largely up to the 
individual states to determine how this standard is applied). 
94. In re Adoption of Ilona, 923 N.E.2d 546, 552 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010), aff’d, 944 N.E.2d 
115 (Mass. 2011). 
[Where there was] little hope that the mother would become a fit parent, there was 
no error in the judge’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental 
rights . . . [despite the social workers’ recognition that] the department could have 
done more in regard to providing services that were more closely tailored to the 
mother’s level of functioning. 
Id. 
95. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760, 769 (1982) (holding that the standard for 
unfitness is by the preponderance of the evidence, and that “until the State proves parental 
unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of 
their natural relationship”). 
96. In considering the fitness of the child’s parent or caretaker, the judge may consider, as 
one of fourteen factors, whether the parent has “a condition which is reasonably likely to 
continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period, such as alcohol or drug addiction, mental 
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However, the challenge that parents with disabilities face is that they may 
not raise non-compliance with the ADA for the first time at the 
termination of parental rights hearing.97  This then begs the question: when 
can such a claim be meaningfully raised?  And when it is raised, is there 
an enforceable result?  Adoption of Gregory made clear that DCF is in fact 
required by law to provide adequately tailored services for parents with 
disabilities.98  The catch twenty-two is that parents cannot raise the 
defense at termination,99 so without judicial authority to mandate that the 
proper services be offered during the pendency of the litigation, the 
determination of adequate services is left completely to the discretion of 
DCF.100  As the Sara Gordon investigation clearly illustrates, this level of 
deference has the potential to cause significant harm to Massachusetts 
families. 
One suggestion offered in Gregory for raising the claim in a timely 
manner was to pursue a claim that the services offered in the service plan 
were inadequate through an administrative fair hearing or other grievance 
process.101  This solution is insufficient on several fronts.  First, in 
Massachusetts, the fair hearings process is conducted within DCF’s legal 
office, so although impartiality is written into the policy,102 it may be 
difficult to achieve in reality.  Second, the fair hearing process can take up 
to ninety days,103 and due to the time-sensitive nature of a care and 
protection case, this delay can be a damaging length of time for both 
parents and children.  Finally, the Supreme Court has found that the 
AACWA does not create a private cause of action for seeking enforcement 
of the reasonable efforts requirement,104 meaning that if parents are 
dissatisfied with the fair hearings decision, they cannot seek redress 
against DCF by filing suit against the agency. 
                                                 
deficiency or mental illness, and the condition makes the parent or other person . . . unlikely to 
provide minimally acceptable care of the child.”  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(c)(xii) (2019). 
97. Adoption of Gregory raised for the first time the question of whether the Americans 
with Disabilities Act applies to the termination of parental rights.  See Adoption of Gregory, 
747 N.E.2d 120, 123 (Mass. 2001).  The court concluded that a claim of inadequate services 
under the ADA could not be raised as a defense to termination of parental rights at a TPR 
hearing.  Id. 
98. Id. at 126. 
99. Adoption of Daisy, 934 N.E.2d 252, 262 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (“It is well-established 
that a parent must raise a claim of inadequate services in a timely manner.”). 
100. Gregory, 747 N.E.2d at 123. 
101. Id. at 127. 
102. The fair hearings process is intended to provide clients who are dissatisfied with 
certain actions an “informal hearing . . . to receive a just and fair decision from an impartial 
hearing officer . . . .”  110 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01 (2019). 
103. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.29 (2019). 
104. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992). 
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Another way that a parent may seek remedy for lack of appropriate 
services resulting in the termination of parental rights is by appellate 
review.105  However, prior to Walt, virtually no appellate decisions held 
that DCF failed to uphold its statutory obligation to make reasonable 
efforts to either prevent removal or promote reunification.106  In fact, there 
have been only two cases in Massachusetts where the appellate court 
found that the Department failed to provide adequate support to a family 
in pursuit of reunification.107  Attorneys around the country report that few 
care and protection cases are appealed at all, and even fewer are 
reversed.108  These procedural challenges illustrate the unique nature of 
care and protection law and highlight the critical importance of policies 
that provide families with adequate and timely remedies during the care 
and protection litigation.  The reasonable efforts requirement was 
established to ensure that irreparable damage is not done to the delicate 
relationships between children and their natural parents;109 if it is to serve 
its purpose, the reasonable efforts requirement must be paired with a 
means of enforcement.   
Part of the difficulty for appeals courts is that by the time a parent 
appeals the termination of parental rights, the child may have been placed 
in substitute care for several years.110  The fact that a reversal of the trial 
decision will disrupt the potential permanency of the child inevitably 
impacts the ruling of appellate judges in care and protection cases.111  By 
the time the breach of duty is found the bond between the child and their 
                                                 
105. A challenge to the termination of parental rights will result in the reviewing court 
“determin[ing] whether the judge’s findings were clearly erroneous and whether [the 
Department] proved parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.”  Custody of Eleanor, 
610 N.E.2d 938, 943 (Mass. 1993). 
106. Kaiser, supra note 16, at 111 n.40. 
107. Care & Prot. of Elaine, 764 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that 
DCF’s efforts to help the father acquire housing were insufficient); Care & Prot. of Talbot, No. 
01-P-1831, 2002 WL 31455226, at *1–2 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 4, 2002) (reversing termination 
of parental rights on account of the trial judge’s reliance on stale information, and because DCF 
offered the mother a “paucity of services” despite her repeated requests for increased services). 
108. Should a Mental Illness Mean You Lose Your Kid?, PROPUBLICA (May 30, 2014, 
5:45 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/should-a-mental-illness-mean-you-lose-your-kid 
[https://perma.cc/3TZ9-SEY3].  Attorneys explained that in termination cases, appellate judges 
are typically very deferential to the trial court’s decision.  Id. 
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2019). 
110. Kaiser, supra note 16, at 103, 103 (“When the appellate court of any state reverses a 
decision of a trial court in a care and protection or adoption case it may also be reversing years 
of work to obtain permanency, safety, and emotional well-being for children who are parties to 
the case.”). 
111. Id. at 113 (“The appellate courts have often excused decidedly non-heroic efforts by 
the Department as good enough to meet its standards, especially when a failure to so find would 
undo the placement of the child.”). 
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natural parents may have been too far lost, and the damage done—
reunification may no longer be in the child’s best interest.  At that point, 
the appellate judges might be influenced by this consideration, despite the 
legal conclusion that the family’s rights had been violated during the care 
and protection proceedings.112  And it would not be wrong to have in mind 
such considerations, because the development of a child happens 
incredibly quickly and the bonds made in early years have a significant 
impact on a child’s health and sense of security.113 
Finally, while the trial judge must make a determination as to whether 
reasonable efforts towards reunification were made, a failure to adhere to 
this requirement does not preclude the judge from making a determination 
based upon the best interests of the child at the TPR hearing.114  The 
finding of whether or not the removal was in the child’s best interest is a 
factual finding, creating a higher deference in judicial review.  Therefore, 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for parents to raise lack of 
reasonable efforts on appeal and win on that argument.115 
A more impactful remedy for parents than appealing their termination 
of parental rights would be to argue, in the moment, that they are not being 
provided with adequate services or visitation time to support their family’s 
reunification.  By bringing a motion for adequate services and visitation 
before the juvenile judge, family defense lawyers may be able to protect 
the rights of their clients before the time for a meaningful remedy has 
passed.  This mechanism of advocacy, however, depends on the premise 
                                                 
112. For example, in Adoption of Gregory, 501 N.E.2d 1179, 1180–81 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1986), DCF made no efforts to reunify the family for the first twenty months of separation, and 
when efforts were made, they amounted to drafting a list of tasks that the parents needed to 
complete before they could reunify with their children.  Despite these extremely limited efforts 
toward reunification, the appeals court focused on the children’s emotional state and bond with 
their pre-adoptive parents in their decision to uphold the trial court’s decision.  Id. at 1183. 
113. See generally Noah Barish, Using the Harm of Removal and Placement to Advocate 
for Parents, JUVENILE RIGHTS PROJECT, INC. (Jan. 7, 2010), http:// 
www.youthrightsjustice.org/media/3844/xxharmandlreplacement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BW2-
9ZP7] (providing research on the long-term harm associated with removal from a parent or 
parents); William Wan, What Separation from Parents Does to Children: “The Effect is 




114. MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 119, § 29C (2019) (“A determination by the court that 
reasonable efforts were not made shall not preclude the court from making any appropriate order 
conducive to the child’s best interest.”); Adoption of Ilona, 944 N.E.2d 115, 123 (Mass. 2011) 
(“[E]ven when the department has failed to meet [the reasonable efforts] obligation, a trial judge 
must still rule in the child’s best interest.”). 
115. Adoption of Gregory held, in regard to accommodating a parent’s disability, that “a 
parent must raise a claim of inadequate services in a timely manner so that reasonable 
accommodations may be made.”  747 N.E.2d 120, 127 (Mass. 2001). 
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that where a judge finds that DCF has not met the reasonable efforts 
requirement, the judge maintains the equitable authority to order DCF to 
adjust the services and visitation that they are currently offering. 
While it remains clear that DCF has a statutory obligation to make 
reasonable efforts to keep the natural family together, both before removal 
and before the TPR hearing, the breadth of the judge’s authority to make 
specific orders to DCF remains unsettled in Massachusetts.116  Walt has 
provided a clear affirmation of the equitable authority that judges have, 
permitting injunctive relief to families for increased services prior to 
removing the child from the home.117  The following Part argues that the 
authority granted in Walt extends to subsequent stages in the care and 
protection proceeding, ensuring that parents are provided with adequate 
services to support reunification throughout the litigation, and certainly 
before DCF moves to terminate their parental rights.118 
II. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN CARE AND PROTECTION 
PROCEEDINGS 
Generally, judicial review of agency decisions acts as a crucial 
mechanism for protecting due process rights within the realm of 
administrative law,119 yet this Part argues that in the context of reasonable 
                                                 
116. See Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 1995). 
[W]e recognize that the statutory scheme is, in some respects, unclear and leaves 
room for the parties . . . to make conflicting arguments about the proper role of a 
court in reviewing the department’s placement decisions.  The Legislature may 
wish to examine the statute to state more definitively the scope of a court’s 
authority when passing on those decisions. 
Id. 
117. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 818 (Mass. 2017) (finding that the single justice 
was authorized to order equitable relief for the parents after determining that the department had 
failed to make reasonable efforts); see also Balmelli O’Connor, supra note 18 (recognizing the 
court’s role in ensuring that DCF follows its statutory obligations and only uses foster care as a 
last resort). 
118. Notably, nothing in the statutory language suggests that there is any differentiation 
between the reasonable efforts requirement as applied prior to removal, and the requirement as 
applied after custody has been granted to DCF.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019).  
Additionally, in Walt, the child had already been placed in DCF’s custody at the time when the 
single justice ordered services and visitation for the father.  84 N.E.3d at 819. 
119. Section 14 of Chapter 30A, the statute that provides for judicial review of state 
agencies in Massachusetts, provides that “except so far as any provision of law expressly 
precludes judicial review, any person or appointing authority aggrieved by a final decision of 
any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding . . . shall be entitled to a judicial review . . . .”  MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 14 (2018); see also Edward D. Re, Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
the Rights of the Individual, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1991); William H. Chamblee, 
Administrative Law: Journey Through the Administrative Process and Judicial Review of 
Administrative Actions, 16 ST. MARY’S L. J. 155, 182 (1984) (“Administrative agencies now 
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efforts, the typical abuse of discretion standard is not the proper test for 
the court to employ.  In child protection proceedings, the court plays a 
much more active role than in most administrative proceedings due to the 
fundamental nature of the rights at stake.120  Instead of the agency taking 
on the role of the adjudicator until all other administrative remedies are 
exhausted, the juvenile court rules on the agency’s activities at many 
stages of litigation.121  This creates a form of “co-parenting” between the 
juvenile court and the child protection agency,122 wherein both the parents 
and the state agency are subject to frequent review and assessment by the 
court.123  This structure is meant to protect parents’ rights and to be 
sensitive to the impact that prolonged and unnecessary separation can 
have on families124 by holding DCF accountable to their own regulations 
and statutory requirements.125 
The relationship between agency and court implicates a deep issue of 
separation of the executive and judiciary, towing a delicate line between 
                                                 
control modern society to such an extent that the rights and liberties of all individuals are 
affected.”). 
120 See cases cited supra note 2. 
121 See, e.g., Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 809–811 (Mass. 2017).  Parents are 
entitled to a hearing before their child is removed from their custody, as articulated in Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972), but in extraordinary circumstances, a post-deprivation 
hearing will suffice in satisfying due process rights.  Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 
333, 345 (4th Cir. 1994). 
Continuing oversight provides an opportunity for the court to account for changes 
in the circumstances of the child or the parents, for evolving relationships with 
individuals significant to the child, for new information coming to light, and for 
deficiencies in a dispositional plan that become apparent over time, all of which 
may have an impact on the continuing efficacy of the original dispositional 
plan. . . .   The juvenile court thus carries a continuing and dynamic responsibility 
to safeguard the interests of its wards. 
Bruce A. Boyer, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child Welfare Agencies: 
The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. L. REV. 377, 388 (1995). 
122. Boyer, supra note 121, at 383–85. 
123. WILLIAM G. JONES, WORKING WITH THE COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION 8, 26–37 
(2006), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/35Y4-ZPSG] 
(providing a non-state-specific outline of a care and protection proceeding from initial hearing 
through termination).  “Today, juvenile court judges hear cases alleging child abuse and neglect, 
delinquency, and status offenses.  Most also hear [termination of parental rights] cases and 
adoption matters.”  Id. at 8. 
124 See Nell Clement, Do “Reasonable Efforts” Require Cultural Competence?  The 
Importance of Culturally Competent Reunification Services in the California Child Welfare 
System, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 397, 418–19 (2008) (explaining the harmful effects 
that removal can have on children and parents alike, with a particular focus on culturally diverse 
families and communities). 
125. See JONES, supra note 123, at 26–27 (providing a detailed explanation of the various 
hearings that parents are entitled to before the court, including the preliminary hearing, TPR 
hearing). 
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when the judge is required to afford deference to DCF’s decisions,126 and 
when the judge may make a determination that DCF is in violation of its 
statutory obligations and require a specific remedy.127  Judicial review of 
DCF decisions is necessary, because “[r]emoval of children irrevocably 
from their biological parents is an exceptionally far reaching exercise of 
State power.”128  However, when it comes to the reasonable efforts 
requirement, a substantial amount of judicial deference is given to DCF in 
regard to whether they have provided adequate reunification services, 
such as visitation time, parenting classes, and re-housing.129  Some reasons 
for this deference are the lack of clarity around the definition of reasonable 
efforts130 and the fact that courts are already hesitant to interfere with an 
administrative agency’s allocation of resources.131 While the tension 
between the executive and judiciary in the realm of administrative law has 
been comprehensively analyzed, “the doctrinal tools used to resolve 
tensions between administrative agencies and their judicial monitors have 
                                                 
126. See Boyer, supra note 121, at 383–84. 
[T]he relationship between juvenile courts and child welfare agencies is not always 
easy, and the boundaries of their respective responsibilities are not always 
clear.  . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he range of views among appellate courts called upon to resolve these 
turf wars may be attributed to the awkward application to the juvenile context of 
conventional tools of administrative and public law, including the separation of 
powers doctrine and the prudential administrative doctrine of exhaustion of 
remedies.  Many reviewing courts have sought to apply these principles to the 
unique relationship between juvenile courts and child welfare agencies within the 
context of broad and imprecisely drawn statutory schemes.  The result is often a 
prohibition on juvenile courts making decisions in areas considered within the 
agency’s discretion. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
127. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 819 (Mass. 2017) (“[W]here a court 
contemplates an injunctive order to compel an executive agency to take specific steps, it must 
tread cautiously in order to safeguard the separation of powers mandated by art. 30 of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.”) (quoting Smith v. Comm’r of 
Transitional Assistance, 729 N.E.2d 627, 651 (Mass. 2000)). 
128. Adoption of Katharine, 674 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). 
129. LEONARD EDWARDS, REASONABLE EFFORTS: A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE 39 (2014) 
(“Whether the juvenile court tries these issues is difficult to determine.  State appellate decisions 
and comments from participants in many states court systems indicate that they are rarely 
litigated.” (footnotes omitted)). 
130. See sources cited supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining how the lack of 
definition at the federal level has impacted state enforcement of the reasonable efforts 
requirement). 
131. Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 16–20 (2008). 
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failed to take adequate account of either the peculiarities of juvenile law 
or the practical problems that plague the field of child welfare.”132 
A. Judicial Deference to Agency Decision-Making 
Each state’s legislature is responsible for the “delineation of shared 
authority between juvenile courts and child welfare agencies.”133  The 
delineation of responsibility in the context of care and protection law is 
far from clear, with many areas of overlap, making it difficult for courts 
to know when they are authorized to make orders contrary to the actions 
or decisions promulgated by DCF.134  The previous standard for judicial 
review of child welfare agency decisions in Massachusetts was 
established in two cases decided on the same day in 1995.  Care and 
Protection of Isaac135 and Care and Protection of Jeremy136 grappled with 
judicial intervention in DCF, specifically in the case of child placement 
decisions.137  The SJC concluded in both cases that, at least when DCF is 
deciding where a child should be placed, decisions of this type rest 
squarely within the agency’s custodial decision-making responsibility and 
may only be overruled by a finding of abuse of discretion.138  Once the 
court identifies, as it did in Isaac and Jeremy, that the decision being 
reviewed is one over which the agency has discretion, it must apply an 
abuse of discretion (or “arbitrary and capricious”) standard of review.139  
                                                 
132. Boyer, supra note 121, at 385. 
133. Id. at 386. 
134. Id. at 383 (“[T]he relationship between juvenile courts and child welfare agencies is 
not always easy, and the boundaries of their respective responsibilities are not always clear.”). 
The jurisdictions of the juvenile court and DHS overlap in numerous and varied 
areas.  One such area involves family services, which is defined in the Juvenile 
Code . . . as . . . “including, but not limited to: child care; homemaker services; 
crisis counseling; cash assistance transportation; family therapy; physical, 
psychiatric, or psychological evaluation; counseling; or treatment, provided to a 
juvenile or his family.” 
Id. at 383 n.13 (quoting Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 802 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Ark. 1992)) 
(emphasis added).  DHS is the Arkansas equivalent of DCF. 
135. See generally Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034 (Mass. 1995). 
136. See generally Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1995). 
137. ee infra Part III. 
138. Id. 
139. The Administrative Procedures Act establishes that agency decisions may only be 
set aside if “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  The Massachusetts statute providing for judicial review of 
administrative agency decisions is MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 14 (2019).  Abuse of discretion 
has been applied commonly, along with the clearly erroneous standard, by juvenile courts 
reviewing the actions of child welfare agencies.  Boyer, supra note 121, at 421 n.94; see In re 
B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376, 380 (Alaska 1986) (“[T]he abuse of discretion standard of review is 
appropriate when the court is presented with agency actions on matters committed to the 
agency’s discretion.”); O’Bryan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 594 P.2d 739, 741 (Nev. 1979) 
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To differentiate the holdings in these two cases from that of Walt, brief 
synopses of Isaac and Jeremy are provided, followed by an assessment of 
the court’s application of the abuse of discretion standard in the latter two 
cases. 
1. Care and Protection of Isaac 
In this case, the SJC reviewed the juvenile judge’s authority to order, 
over the objection of DCF, that DCF provide a certain residential 
placement for a child in its custody.140  The child and his four siblings had 
been adjudicated “children in need of protection” and placed in DCF 
custody.141  Shortly after gaining custody of Isaac, DCF placed him in a 
specialized school.142  When his emotional state began to deteriorate, DCF 
then committed him to an adolescent psychiatric treatment program.143  
After some time at the hospital, Isaac’s treating psychiatrist recommended 
that he be discharged and allowed to return to the specialized school, with 
the addition of a behavioral support staff member assigned to assist him 
in the classroom.144  DCF rejected the suggestion, in part because the staff 
member assigned to support Isaac would cost DCF an additional $160 per 
day.145  DCF had ceased to fund this type of one-to-one service as of 1990, 
based on the concern that such services were “inordinately expensive.”146  
At the hearing on a motion for increased visitation brought by the mother, 
Isaac’s guardian ad litem raised concerns about his continued placement 
at the psychiatric hospital.147  The judge, treating the hearing as a review 
and redetermination of Isaac and his four siblings’ current needs, ordered 
that Isaac be returned to his previous placement and given the support of 
a one-to-one aide in the classroom.148  The Department brought a petition 
for relief from the order before the single justice, and the justice brought 
the issue before the full court.149 
                                                 
(finding that deference to agency decisions is upheld, unless the court finds that the decisions 
were arbitrary or illegal) (the decision in O’Bryan was later questioned by Division of Child and 
Family Services v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 92 P.3d 1239, 1246 (Nev. 2004), where the 
court held that the court need not apply the arbitrary and capricious standard based on the 
subsequent statutory changes providing the juvenile court jurisdiction to make custodial 
decisions). 
140. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1038. 
141. Id. at 1035. 
142. Id. at 1036. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 1035. 
146. Id. at 1036. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 1037. 
149. Id. at 1036. 
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The discrete issue raised by the single justice was whether a “judge 
sitting in a juvenile session [has] authority to order the Department . . . to 
provide a specific placement and a specific staffing level for a child who 
has been adjudicated to be in need of care and protection and committed 
to DCF’s (other than temporary) custody.”150  The court concluded that 
the judge did not have the authority to make such an order against the 
objection of DCF, as DCF maintains the power to make such decisions for 
children in its custody, absent a finding of abuse of discretion.151 
2. Care and Protection of Jeremy 
While Isaac dealt with the court’s authority to oppose a placement 
decision for a child in the permanent custody of DCF, its immediate 
successor, Jeremy, dealt with the same question but in reference to a child 
who is in the temporary custody of DCF.152  In Care and Protection of 
Jeremy, DCF placed the child in a long-term residential treatment program 
after removing him from several foster homes due to disruptive 
behavior.153  The child’s attorney did not agree with this placement, 
arguing that Jeremy should instead be placed in a specialized foster home, 
which would be far less restrictive than the residential program.154  After 
an evidentiary hearing that spanned several months, the judge agreed with 
Jeremy’s attorney’s opposition to his placement and entered an order 
requiring DCF to place him in a specialized foster home.155  DCF again 
brought a petition for relief from the order before the single justice, who 
vacated the order, deciding that the judge had improperly substituted her 
“view of what is in the best interest of the child for that of the 
[D]epartment.”156  The SJC reached the same conclusion as they had in 
Isaac: the judge did not have the authority, absent a finding of abuse of 
discretion, to make a decision in opposition to DCF in a matter involving 
the placement of a child in DCF’s custody, even if the grant of custody to 
DCF was merely temporary.157 
                                                 
150. Id. at 1034. 
151. Id. at 1039. 




156. Id. at 1030–31. 
157. Id. at 1033 (“We have concluded that G.L. c. 119 allots to the department the 
authority to determine the residence of a child committed to its custody on a temporary basis.”). 
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B. Why Do Courts Apply the Abuse of Discretion Standard? 
In both Jeremy and Isaac, the SJC held that the abuse of discretion 
standard must be applied in reviewing DCF’s placement decisions, rather 
than finding that the judge had the general authority to make a 
determination in the best interests of the child.158  The court applied the 
abuse of discretion standard because it concluded that these custodial 
placement decisions remain squarely within the discretion of DCF, 
therefore mandating deference on the part of the court.159  Review under 
an abuse of discretion standard is narrow, disallowing the court from 
substituting its judgment for that of the agency.160 
The threshold question for determining what standard of review to 
apply is whether the court is conducting a traditional review of an 
administrative decision based on the Massachusetts child welfare statute, 
Chapter 119.161  The court in Isaac provides an in-depth analysis of 
“whether the administrative scheme created by G.L. c. 119, §§ 21–
37 . . . differs substantially from the ordinary administrative scheme in the 
degree of authority given to the courts and the manner in which it may be 
exercised,”162 by scrutinizing how Chapter 119 allocates authority.  To 
                                                 
158. Throughout its analysis, the court in Isaac draws a distinction between the court’s 
power to decide to whom custody will be assigned, and custodial decisions to be made after 
custody has been decided.  For example, Section 29B provides that when “conducting a 
permanency hearing, the court may make any appropriate orders as may be in the child or the 
young adult’s best interests including, but not limited to, orders with respect to care or custody.”  
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29B (2018).  Yet the court rejected the trial judge’s conclusion 
that “G.L. c. 119, considered in its entirety, grants authority to a judge to resolve a dispute 
between the department and other interested parties concerning a suitable residential placement 
for a child in the department’s custody.”  Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Mass. 
1995). 
159. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1041 (“[W]e take this opportunity to discuss how a judge in a 
care and protection proceeding should handle a challenge to the department’s exercise of its 
custodial powers.”) (emphasis added); Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033 (“[The last sentence of § 
29] cannot logically be read to contain a broad grant of authority to a judge to impose conditions 
or limitations on the department’s exercise of its custodial powers.”) (emphasis added).  In 
Hawaii, the Court of Appeals grappled with this same question.  The court originally found that 
“‘the decision as to what custodial arrangements are in the best interests of the child is a matter 
or question of ultimate fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard of review,’ insofar 
as it applies to a family court’s review of a DHS determination that its placement decision is in 
a child’s best interest.”  In re AS, 312 P.3d 1193, 1213 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In Interest 
of Doe, 784 P.2d 873, 880 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989)).  In re AS overturned this standard of review, 
finding that “the family court, based on the evidence presented, must make its own 
determination regarding whether the placement of the child is in the child’s best interest.”  Id. 
160. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2001); Marsh v. Oregon Natural 
Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 655 F.3d 1124, 1132 
(9th Cir. 2011); Gardner v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 638 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011). 
161. See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 (2019). 
162. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1037. 
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reach the conclusion that Chapter 119 does not provide a general grant of 
authority to the judge to enter orders in the best interest of the child, the 
court looked to the second paragraph of Section 26, which provides the 
action the court can take if a child is found in need of care and 
protection.163  The trial judge relied upon this section for the authority to 
resolve disputes between the parent or guardian and DCF about custodial 
decisions.164  The court points out the disjunctive language in the statute, 
that the judge “may commit the child to the custody of the 
department . . . or may make any other appropriate order with reference 
to the care and custody of the child as may conduce to his best interests.”165  
Following this language, the court concluded that once the judge 
determines that placing the child in the custody of DCF is in the best 
interest of the child, DCF asserts the authority to make all custodial 
decisions and the judge can no longer intervene.166 
Interestingly, Section 26 of Chapter 119 is no longer written in the 
disjunctive, and instead provides that the court “also may make any other 
appropriate order . . . about the care and custody of the child as may be in 
the child’s best interest” and then provides a non-exhaustive list of 
potential custodial orders, for example “order[ing] appropriate physical 
care including medical or dental.”167  This amendment to the statute 
arguably alters the analysis provided by the court in Isaac.  At the time 
when Jeremy and Isaac were decided, the SJC pointed to the lack of clarity 
around the scope of the judge’s authority in the area of child welfare law 
and suggested that legislative action may be appropriate to clarify under 
whose authority placement decisions fall.168  Were this same issue to come 
before the court again, it is possible that the SJC would conclude that 
Section 26 does in fact provide the judge with general authority to resolve 
disputes and make a determination in the best interest of the child, even 
for custodial decisions such as placement and education.169  Regardless, 
the change in the language of Section 26 may provide additional support 
for equitable judicial authority over decisions that implicate the best 
interests of the child. 
The SJC also focused on the language found in Section 21, which 
provides the definition of “custodial” and instructions on what a parent or 
                                                 
163. ch. 119, § 26. 
164. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1038. 
165. Id. at 1037 n.3 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 119, § 26) (emphasis added). 
166. Id. at 1038. 
167. § 26(b) (emphasis added). 
168. See Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 1995). 
169. See Div. of Child & Family Servs. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 92 P3d 1239, 1246 
(Nev. 2004). 
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guardian may do if they disagree with a custodial decision made by 
DCF.170  If a parent or guardian is dissatisfied with a custodial decision, 
they may challenge that decision, and the judge is authorized to “review 
and make an order on the matter.”171  In Isaac, the child’s attorney argued 
that in the absence of language limiting the standard of review to abuse of 
discretion, such legislative intent should not be presumed.172  The SJC, 
however, adopted a traditional reading of “review” in the context of 
judicial review of an administrative proceeding, concluding that “the 
appropriate standard of review is error of law or abuse of discretion, as 
measured by the ‘arbitrary or capricious test.’”173 
Following its analysis in Isaac, the court reaffirms the scope of 
judicial authority in Jeremy, further elaborating on its finding that Chapter 
119 does not grant power to the judiciary to make custodial decisions.174  
While the court acknowledged that a grant of equitable jurisdiction “is a 
grant of broad power to act in the best interests of a person properly within 
the jurisdiction of the court,”175 that power does not include “decid[ing] 
questions committed by law to the determination of public officials.”176  
“[W]here the means of carrying out [a] statutory duty is within the 
discretion of the public official, courts normally will not direct how the 
public official should exercise that statutory duty.”177  The court 
acknowledges its struggle to parse out the extent of equitable authority by 
stating: 
[W]e recognize that the statutory scheme is, in some respects, unclear 
and leaves room for the parties in this case, and in Care and Protection 
of Isaac . . . to make conflicting arguments about the proper role of a 
court in reviewing the department’s placement decisions.  The 
Legislature may wish to examine the statute to state more definitively 
the scope of a court’s authority when passing on those decisions.178 
Perhaps the most illustrative example of the court’s uncertainty 
applying this level of administrative deference is the court’s 
                                                 
170. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 § 21 (2019); Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 
1038–39 (Mass. 1995). 
171. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1038. 
172. Id. at 1039.  
173. Id. (quoting Caswell v. Licensing Comm’n for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922, 930 (Mass. 
1983)). 
174. Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031. 
175. Id. at 1033. 
176. Id. (quoting Capuano, Inc. v. School Bldg. Comm. of Wilbraham, 115 N.E.2d 491, 
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acknowledgment that a judge’s equitable authority may fluctuate 
depending on the type of custodial decision being made.  The court 
reasoned that decisions such as the “termination of visitation between a 
child and his parents, and the authorization for extraordinary forms of 
medical treatment, raise issues not raised by the choice of a child’s 
residence.”179  In support of this distinction, the court states that the judge 
has broader discretion in these types of custodial decisions “for reasons 
not related to the structure and language of the governing legislation.”180  
Therefore, it is fair to say that this decision is limited to the placement of 
children in DCF’s temporary or permanent custody. 
This means, in terms of the reasonable efforts requirement, that it is 
not necessarily clear what level of judicial review should be applied to 
DCF’s decisions about what services to provide, because while efforts to 
reunify the family may include decisions about the placement of the child, 
such efforts are not limited to custodial decisions.181  The matter of what 
services DCF does or does not provide for families relates to “issues not 
raised by the choice of a child’s residence,”182 such as DCF’s direct 
statutory obligations and the rights of parents under the ADA.  While the 
analysis provided in Jeremy and Isaac helps to illuminate how courts 
contemplate the issue of judicial review of DCF decisions, Care and 
Protection of Walt provides a different form of judicial review in the face 
of DCF’s failure to fulfill a statutory obligation.183  The very same failure 
that kept Sara Gordon separated from her baby daughter for over two 
years.184 
III. THE GRANT OF EQUITABLE AUTHORITY WHEN DCF FAILS TO 
MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS 
The consecutive rulings in Isaac and Jeremy at once affirmed the 
power of DCF and limited the power of the judiciary.  This limitation was 
based on the fact that the agency’s objection to a placement change 
remained squarely within its custodial powers without violating any 
statutory obligations and did not infringe on the rights of children or 
                                                 
179. Id. at 1031 n.7. 
180. Id. 
181. See 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.002–7.095 (2019) (providing a list of services 
available to families in Massachusetts, including homemaking services, parent aide services, 
and emergency shelter services). 
182. Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031 n.7. 
183. See Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 817–820 (Mass. 2017). 
184. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 6. 
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parents.185  The decisions contested in both Isaac and Jeremy did not 
directly contradict DCF’s policies and regulations, because while DCF is 
tasked with making decisions in the best interests of the child, it is also 
bound to consider allocation of resources when making custodial 
decisions.186  In contrast, the decision made by DCF in Walt directly 
implicated a statutory obligation.187  Therefore, the SJC’s decision in Walt 
does not necessarily overrule Jeremy and Isaac.188  The distinction made 
in Walt explicitly addresses the custodial nature of the decisions in Jeremy 
and Isaac and distinguishes such decisions from instances where DCF 
failed to meet an obligation.189  The ruling in Walt provides family defense 
attorneys with a valuable solution for the lack of timely remedy for their 
clients who are not receiving adequate support in their efforts towards 
family reunification. 
A. Care and Protection of Walt 
The child in Walt was removed from his home at the age of three after 
a report was filed with DCF alleging neglect against Walt’s parents.190  
The DCF investigator arrived at the apartment unannounced to follow up 
on the report, and (as was illuminated during the seventy-two-hour 
custody hearing) made the decision within ten minutes of entering the 
apartment to remove Walt from the home.191  The investigator’s major 
concerns were the state of the home and the smell of marijuana.192  
According to the investigator, the upstairs portion of the home, where the 
family was living, was littered with trash, including dirty plates, cups, 
cigarette butts, and a chicken bone.193  The investigator, with the approval 
of her supervisor, initiated an emergency removal and Walt went into DCF 
custody.194  The affidavit attached to DCF’s petition for temporary 
custody, which was signed by both the supervisor and the investigator, 
stated that “reasonable efforts by the department were attempted.”195  
However, at the seventy-two-hour hearing, the investigator admitted that 
she did not know whether DCF could provide assistance with cleaning the 
                                                 
185. “[I]n this case, we are concerned with the department’s authority to determine the 
place of abode of a child in its custody.”  Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031 n.7. 
186. Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 1036–37 (Mass. 1995). 
187. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 814 (Mass. 2017). 
188. Id. at 819. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 807. 
191. Id. at 810. 
192. Id. at 808. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 809. 
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home, or whether “counseling and management services” were available 
to the parents prior to removal.196  She also testified that “it was not her 
job to make reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal 
before removing a child to the custody of the department.”197 
The father petitioned for interlocutory relief, and the single justice of 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court determined that DCF had an obligation 
to adhere to their statutory mandates, namely the obligation to make 
reasonable efforts prior to removal.198  Finding that DCF had failed to 
make any reasonable efforts, the single justice found DCF did not meet its 
obligation.199  Not only did the single justice make a determination that no 
reasonable efforts had been made, but he also remedied the situation by 
making specific orders for DCF to provide services.200  The services 
ordered included daily supervised visitation between Walt and his father, 
that Walt’s father be included in special education meetings, and that DCF 
explore alternative housing options for the parents, all in support of 
reunification.201 
Faced again with the challenge of defining the scope of equitable 
authority, the SJC came to a quite different conclusion than it did in Isaac 
or Jeremy.  Rather than applying an abuse of discretion standard, the court 
acknowledged that at the seventy-two-hour hearing, the judge has the 
responsibility to determine whether reasonable efforts were made prior to 
removal of the child, “separate and distinct from the judge’s certification 
regarding the child’s best interests that decides whether the child should 
remain in the custody of the department.”202  The fact that abuse of 
discretion was not the standard applied in Walt suggests that enforcement 
of the reasonable efforts requirement should be evaluated differently than 
custodial decisions regarding children in DCF custody.  Because the judge 
was not reviewing a custodial decision made by DCF at the behest of a 
parent or guardian, but instead making a determination required by state 
statute,203 the court recognized that judges have equitable authority in this 
area.204  Furthermore, the court found that the authority granted to the 
                                                 
196. Id. at 810. 
197. Id. 
198. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019). 
199. Walt, 84 N.E.3d at 810. 
200. Id. at 810–11. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 817. 
203. See supra notes 8, 10, 11 and accompanying text. 
204. Walt, 84 N.E.3d at 817 (“Where, as here, the single justice found that the department 
failed to fulfil its duty to make reasonable efforts before taking custody of Walt, he had the 
equitable authority to order the department to take reasonable remedial steps to diminish the 
adverse consequences of its breach of duty.”). 
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judge to make the reasonable efforts determination also provides them 
with the “authority to order the department to take reasonable remedial 
steps to diminish the adverse consequences of the department’s failure to 
do so.”205 
While the same issues of separation of powers and allocation of 
resources exist in Walt, in contrast to Isaac and Jeremy, the holding firmly 
supports the single justice’s authority to order DCF to take very specific 
action.206  The interpretation of judicial authority follows Jeremy and 
Isaac in that the SJC recognized that “where the department has been 
awarded temporary custody of a child in a care and protection proceeding, 
‘decisions related to normal incidents of custody’ generally are committed 
to the discretion of the department, reviewable only for abuse of 
discretion.”207  The court elects not to rule on “the full scope of judicial 
authority to issue injunctive orders where the department has been 
awarded temporary custody of a child, or the limitations on that 
authority.”208  However, it is stated concretely that 
where the department has been awarded temporary custody of a child 
after failing to fulfill its duty to make reasonable efforts to prevent or 
eliminate the need for the child’s removal, from parental custody, a 
judge has the equitable authority to take reasonable steps to attempt to 
remedy the adverse consequences on the child and the parents arising 
from the department’s breach of that duty.209 
Perhaps part of the court’s willingness to enforce judicial authority in 
this area is based on the fact that failure to make reasonable efforts prior 
to removing the child can have an immediate and serious impact on the 
family, and therefore equitable relief is necessary to counter that harm.210  
Because it was too late for DCF to rectify the error by making reasonable 
efforts prior to removal, the single justice was justified in “ensur[ing] that 
the department fulfilled its duty to make it possible for the child to return 
safely to his father or to attempt to hasten the time when that reunification 
would become practicable.”211  In this case, the court agreed with the 
single justice that in order to protect Walt and his family from the 
                                                 
205. Id. at 807. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 819 (citing Commonwealth v. Adkinson, 813 N.E.2d 506, 513 (Mass. 2004)). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. “[T]he single justice was entitled to conclude from the evidence in the record that the 
department’s failure to make reasonable efforts also adversely affected Walt and his family and 
that reasonable equitable relief was needed to diminish that adverse impact.”  Id. at 818. 
211. Id. 
 
2020] CARE AND PROTECTION OF WALT 159 
imminent harm of their prolonged separation, it was reasonable to order 
DCF to act specifically and immediately to remedy this harm.212 
Another reason that the court may have found an expanded grant of 
equitable authority in this circumstance is that the single justice did not 
attempt to substitute his own judgment for that of DCF while reviewing a 
department decision.  Instead, the justice ordered injunctive relief in a 
response to DCF’s clear failure to meet its statutory imperatives.213  Courts 
may be reluctant to order the kind of provided found in Walt because, 
“where a court contemplates an injunctive order to compel an executive 
agency to take specific steps, it must tread cautiously in order to safeguard 
the separation of powers.”214  But if the court does determine that DCF 
clearly failed to make reasonable efforts, the judge may find this failure 
harmful to the family and provide an injunctive order to remedy the 
harm.215 
Finally, in Walt, the order for injunctive relief was made in reaction 
to the absence of agency action in violation of a statutory obligation.216  
This contrasts with Isaac and Jeremy, where the judges substituted their 
judgment for that of the agency to rule on a decision between two 
placement options, neither of which would have been in violation of 
DCF’s statutory requirements.217  “Only when, at the time a judicial order 
is entered, there is but one way in which [an] obligation may properly be 
fulfilled, is a judge warranted in telling a public agency precisely how it 
must fulfill its legal obligation.”218  When making a reasonable efforts 
determination, the court must decide whether DCF made adequate efforts 
to reunify—not a choice between alternative satisfactory options, but a 
question of whether or not DCF met its obligation at all.219  If opposing 
                                                 
212. Id. at 817. 
213. Id. at 810–811. 
214. Id. at 819 (quoting Smith v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 729 N.E.2d 627, 
636 (Mass. 2000)). 
215. Id. 
216. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019). 
217. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 23 (2019); Adoption of Talik, 84 N.E.3d 889, 897 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2017) (“Placement decisions, as opposed to custody decisions, fall within the 
discretionary power of the legal custodian as one of the usual incidents of custody.”) (quoting 
Care & Prot. of Manuel, 703 N.E.2d 211, 216 (Mass. 1998)). 
218. Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Mass. 1995). 
219. Particularly when advocating for parents with disabilities, the ADA makes clear that 
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefit of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2016).  Application 
of the ADA to everything DCF does means that services provided to parents with disabilities 
must be catered to these parents’ specific needs, and failure to provide properly tailored services 
is a failure to meet the statutory obligation.  See DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 10. 
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counsel can show that DCF failed to meet this obligation, for example, by 
not providing any specialized services to a parent with an intellectual 
disability, it is no longer solely within the discretion of DCF to determine 
how they should meet the requirement.  While the “placement of 
individuals and the coordination of the provision of services financed by 
[a social service agency] are executive functions,”220 the determination of 
whether or not DCF has fulfilled its statutory requirement is a function of 
the judiciary.221 
B. Applying Care and Protection of Walt Beyond the Temporary 
Custody Hearing 
Now that Walt has established that the scope of equitable authority 
extends to making specific orders that remedy a breach of statutory duty, 
the question remains as to whether this same power exists if a judge makes 
this determination at the permanency hearing, rather than at the temporary 
custody hearing.222  While the Walt court focused on the particular 
language regarding reasonable efforts prior to removal, the rest of the 
statute states that once a child has been placed in DCF’s custody, the 
purpose of the reasonable efforts requirement shifts from “eliminat[ing] 
the need for removal from the home” to “mak[ing] it possible for the child 
to return safely to his parent or guardian.”223  If the judge has granted 
custody to DCF, the judge must decide no less than annually “whether the 
department or its agents has made reasonable efforts to make it possible 
for the child to return safely to his parent or guardian.”224 
Because it is within the court’s power to make specific orders 
remedying DCF’s failure prior to taking custody, it logically follows that 
this same power exists when DCF breaches the same obligation later in 
the proceedings.225  The very same risk of harm to the family exists if DCF 
fails to provide a service plan reasonably tailored to the needs of the 
parents, regardless of whether this occurs after the child has been 
                                                 
220. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1039. 
221. In re McKnight, 550 N.E.2d 856, 859 (Mass. 1990) (holding that where an executive 
agency has a legal obligation, and “there is but one way in which that obligation may properly 
be fulfilled,” the judiciary may order the enforcement of the obligation). 
222. On account of the facts of the case, Walt focused exclusively on the judge’s authority 
to remedy a reasonable efforts breach prior to removal of the child from the home.  Care & Prot. 
of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 801, 810 (Mass. 2017). 
223. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019). 
224. Id. 
225. The precise language which requires the court to make a determination of reasonable 
efforts prior to placement with DCF is mirrored later in the statute, requiring the court to make 
a determination no less than annually as to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to make 
it possible for the child to return safely to his parent or guardian.  Id. 
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adjudicated in need of care and protection or prior to removal from the 
home.226  If parents do not have the opportunity to argue this issue prior 
to the TPR hearing, then there is truly no enforcement mechanism 
ensuring that this requirement is followed, which may result in improper 
removals.  The requirement may be overlooked and treated as a 
“checking-of-a-box” without meaningful adherence, rather than a true 
procedural protection.  With the precedent established in Walt, if a court 
finds that DCF is failing to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family, 
it may take action and order that those efforts be made.227 
The amendments to Section 29 of Chapter 119 discussed in Part II 
also suggest a legislative change in the allocation of judicial authority 
since the deciding of Isaac.228  Because of the shift away from the 
disjunctive and the inclusion of a non-exhaustive list of possible actions 
that the judge may take in the best interest of the child,229 it could be 
reasonably argued that a dissatisfied parent could petition the court to 
make orders in the best interest of the child, such as visitation and services 
to promote reunification of the family.  This would be an additional 
avenue for arguing lack of reasonable efforts prior to the TPR hearing, and 
it is congruous with the equitable authority granted by Walt.  Finally, 
while the language of Section 29C makes clear that the court must make 
a reasonable efforts determination no less than annually, this does not 
necessarily mean that the court is limited to making a reasonable efforts 
determination at the permanency hearing.230  The mandate of the 
                                                 
226. The impact of prolonged separation between parent and biological parent, even of 
that parent cannot fully provide for all of the child’s needs, is well documented.  In Ms. L. v. 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1146–47 (S.D. Cal. 2018), 
the court relied on an amicus brief submitted by the Children’s Defense Fund, and based on the 
arguments presented found: 
[T]here is ample evidence that separating children from their mothers or fathers 
leads to serious, negative consequences to children’s health and development” and 
the stress of forced separation “put[] children at increased risk for both physical 
and mental illness . . . .  And the psychological distress, anxiety, and depression 
associated with separation from a parent would follow the children well after the 
immediate period of separation—even after eventual reunification with a parent or 
other family. 
Id. 
227. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 820 (Mass. 2017). 
228. Supra Section II.B. 
229. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019). 
230.  Id. 
[I]f a court has previously committed, granted custody or transferred responsibility 
for a child to the department or its agent, the court shall determine not less than 
annually whether the department or its agent has made reasonable efforts to make 
it possible for the child to return safely to his parent or guardian. 
Id. 
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reasonable efforts requirement is to make reunification possible, and 
because this is an ongoing mandate, a parent (or child) could petition the 
court to make a determination on an alleged breach of this statutory duty 
at any part of the process when the provision of services is, in fact, not 
promoting reunification. 
C. Judicial Authority over Visitation 
In additional support of the argument that the court has equitable 
authority to make specific orders for services is the fact that the court may 
order visitation in the best interest of the child.231  Even after the custody 
of the child has been transferred to DCF, the parents retain the right to 
visit their child as long as visitation will not injure the welfare of the child 
or the public interest.232  The court addressed this authority specifically in 
Walt, emphasizing that “the single justice did not exceed his authority or 
abuse his discretion by ordering a visitation schedule that would enable 
[the parenting] bond to remain intact.”233  The grant of judicial authority 
in this particular area is due to the fact that “visitation, like custody, is at 
the core of a parent’s relationship with a child,” and the critical importance 
of parenting time to the parent-child relationship implicates the best 
interest of the child.234 
Additionally, the court may order visitation between parent and child 
even after the parent’s rights have been terminated.235  This broad sweep 
of equitable authority allows the judge to determine whether the best 
interests of the child will be served, and in doing so, allows them to grant 
orders that may be against the will of the child’s legal custodian.236  The 
court, acting in its capacity to serve the child’s best interests, may even 
oppose the adequacy of an adoption plan if it does not provide for 
visitation with the biological parents, and such visitation would be in the 
                                                 
231. See Care & Prot. of Three Minors, 467 N.E.2d 851, 860 (Mass. 1984); Custody of a 
Minor (No. 2), 467 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (Mass. 1984) (“[B]efore terminating visitation rights, a 
judge must make specific findings demonstrating that parental visits will harm the child or the 
public welfare.”). 
232. Custody of a Minor, 467 N.E.2d at 1291 (citing Care & Prot. of Three Minors, 467 
N.E.2d at 851). 
233. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 818 (Mass. 2017).  
234. Id. at 818 (quoting L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate & Family Court Dep’t, 49 
N.E. 3d 230, 239 (Mass. 2016)). 
235. In re Adoption of Rico, 905 N.E.2d 552, 560 (Mass. 2009) (holding that the court 
was within its equitable authority to order post-termination visitation between child and 
biological parent where the child’s best interests would be served by maintaining and honoring 
that bond). 
236. See Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 174 (Mass. 1999) (holding that the court 
had authority to order visitation between child and prior permanent guardian, even over the 
objections of the father, who had legal custody of the child). 
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child’s best interests.237  The position of the juvenile court to make orders 
regarding visitation is yet another argument for broad judicial authority to 
make orders in the best interests of the child, including provision of 
services that will help the child return home.238 
D. Impact of Judicial Enforcement of the Reasonable Efforts 
Requirement 
To illustrate how a broader grant of judicial authority to find a failure 
to make reasonable efforts and order a remedy to that failure, it may be 
helpful to imagine the impact that this would have as a case unfolds.  
Applying a requirement that particular services be offered to parents as a 
prerequisite before DCF can change the child’s goal to adoption would 
ensure that parents are not deemed unfit before being given the 
opportunity to prove their parenting potential.239  Recognizing the court’s 
authority to offer relief to parents who are clearly not receiving adequate 
services would provide parents with an avenue to compel DCF to provide 
a service plan that would meaningfully support reunification of the 
family.240 
Had the court enforced the provision of services in Sara Gordon’s 
case, this family may have had a profoundly different experience.  If Sara 
had been able to raise a lack of reasonable efforts claim, she could have 
argued for increased visitation to support her acquisition of the parenting 
skills that were allegedly lacking.241  She could have petitioned for a 
                                                 
237. In re Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Mass. 2000) (“[W]e hold that a judge 
may order limited postadoption contact, including visitation, between a child and a biological 
parent where such contact is currently in the best interests of the child.”). 
238. See SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, FAMILY 
TIME PRACTICE GUIDE: A GUIDE TO PROVIDING APPROPRIATE FAMILY TIME FOR CHILDREN 
IN FOSTER CARE 45 (2019), http://judgeleonardedwards.com/docs/family-time-georgia.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2NY-KL8L] (explaining the role of courts in ensuring proper family 
visitation time). 
239. See Booth & Booth, supra note 1 (providing empirical studies supporting no 
connection between intelligence and parenting ability, but explaining that judges and service 
providers must work actively to avoid “what might be called the mistake of false attribution or 
seeing all the problems parents may be having entirely in terms of their learning difficulties.”). 
240. See, e.g., Robyn M. Powell, Safeguarding the Rights of Parents With Intellectual 
Disabilities in Child Welfare Cases: The Convergence of Social Science and Law, 20 CUNY L. 
REV. 127, 145–47 (2016) (explaining how advocates should use social science and empirical 
research about parents with disabilities in order to advocate for their clients and ensure that their 
rights are protected). 
241. See IASSID Special Interest Research Grp. on Parents & Parenting with Intellectual 
Disabilities, Parents Labelled with Intellectual Disability: Position of the IASSID SIRG on 
Parents and Parenting with Intellectual Disabilities, 21 J. APPLIED RES. INTELL. DISABILITIES 
296, 301 (2008) [hereinafter IASSID SIRG] (reviewing the state of knowledge on parents with 
intellectual disabilities and their children, and concluding that parents labeled with intellectual 
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parent aide with experience helping parents with intellectual disabilities, 
articulating her rights under the ADA, and the necessity of this service to 
promote reunification with her daughter.  Rather than being forced to 
resort to the DOJ after exhausting her options in juvenile court, Sara could 
have had the opportunity to efficiently and effectively advocate in court 
for the services necessary to help her provide adequate care to her child. 
If the judge found that DCF had in fact failed to make reasonable efforts 
in compliance with the ADA, the court could have ordered DCF to provide 
such services, thereby protecting Sara’s rights prior to her TPR hearing.  
If she were then dissatisfied with the court’s decision regarding her 
petition for services and DCF’s adherence to the reasonable efforts 
requirement, she would have had the opportunity to petition for 
interlocutory relief of the court’s ruling on the adequacy of the services 
being provided to her.  While Sara was able to (and did) advocate for 
increased visitation and services, absent a reading of Walt granting 
judicial authority to find a lack of reasonable efforts and implement a 
remedy, such requests may not result in a court order.242  The current 
combination of deference to DCF for defining what are reasonable 
reunification services and the stark lack of guidance for social workers on 
how to act in compliance with disability law is unlikely to result in 
compliance with the ADA and DCF’s statutory requirements.243 
The ability to effectively advocate lack of reasonable efforts would 
mean ensuring that parents with intellectual disabilities are afforded a fair 
chance to prove themselves as capable parents. For parents with 
disabilities, as with all parents, caring for children is a learning process.244  
With full discretion over what services are adequate, DCF may use the 
consequences of its intervention (for example, a parent’s lack of 
responsiveness to the child’s cues) to justify the continued separation.  
Parents who have limited time with their children begin to lose their 
parent-child bond, and the child may become more and more attached to 
                                                 
disabilities “acquire parenting knowledge and skills when appropriate teaching methods are 
used.”). 
242. Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Mass. 1995). 
243. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 23–24.  The letter to the Commissioner 
recognizes that DCF has “failed to provide appropriate policies and training for social workers 
to understand their obligations to ensure the civil rights of parents with disabilities.”  Id. 
244. See generally Maurice A. Feldman, Parenting Education for Parents with 
Intellectual Disabilities: A Review of Outcome Studies, 15 RES. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 
299 (1994) (providing a detailed review of twenty different studies addressing parenting 
abilities of parents with intellectual disabilities and recognizing the need for further research in 
the area of programs that teach parenting skills to this group of parents). 
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their substitute placement.245  Additionally, a hands-on learning method is 
particularly important for parents with disabilities.246  A social worker 
with no experience working with parents with intellectual disabilities may 
not feel it necessary or appropriate to provide any education to the parents 
during their visits, yet this support during visitation is precisely what 
would most help the parents.247  Without frequent visitation and parenting 
education, a parent with an intellectual disability is unlikely to see 
improvement in the areas identified by DCF as the reason for the 
parent/child separation.248  At that point, the lack of progress may be used 
to prove permanent unfitness at the TPR hearing, when it would be too 
late to raise an argument of insufficient efforts. 
The DOJ and HSS report provides many suggestions for services, and 
in fact, these services are largely drawn from DCF’s own policies.249  Yet 
clearly the mere existence of these policies remains insufficient to ensure 
their implementation, and the services provided to parents with 
intellectual disabilities are in desperate need of bolstering.250  Court 
enforcement would not only benefit parents like Sara, but would also 
                                                 




246. Maurice A. Feldman et al., Teaching Child-Care Skills to Mothers with 
Developmental Disabilities, 25 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 205, 209 (1992).  At the 
conclusion of the training, the eleven mothers with intellectual disabilities were performing the 
parenting skills at a higher level than the control group of non-handicapped mothers.  Id. at 210.  
For more information about Dr. Feldman’s research and approach to assessing parental capacity, 
see generally MAURICE FELDMAN & MARJORIE AUNOS, COMPREHENSIVE, COMPETENCE-
BASED PARENTING ASSESSMENT FOR PARENTS WITH LEARNING DIFFICULTIES AND THEIR 
CHILDREN (2011) (providing resources for professionals and presenting an innovative approach 
to assessing parental capacity to aid with custody decisions). 
247. See Sandra T. Azar & Kristin N. Read, Parental Cognitive Disabilities and Child 
Protection Services: The Need for Human Capacity Building, 36 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 127, 
133 (2009). 
We believe [child protective services] will be less effective with cases involving 
[parents with cognitive disabilities] because of a mis-match of their typical 
approaches to what may be the special needs of the parents involved (e.g., a high 
reliance on parents orchestrating their own services, time-limited parent education 
as the vehicles for change, and traditional service provision, such as 
psychotherapy) and residual biases that still exist toward this population. 
Id. 
248. See Parents with Intellectual Disabilities, THE ARC (Mar. 3, 2011), 
https://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3659 [https://perma.cc/U23Y-NAWM]. 
249. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 17. 
250. ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 65, at 171 (“A study of child welfare evaluations 
found that evaluators were largely unable to identify appropriate or adapted interventions for 
supporting or strengthening the parenting capacities of people with disabilities.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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benefit DCF in supporting compliance with its legal obligations under the 
ADA.  Further clarification of DCF’s obligation under the reasonable 
efforts requirement, codified within its own regulations, would also 
further help create unity among courts and clarity across the state as to the 
scope of this requirement. 
E. Additional Proposed Methods to Ensure Adequate Services for 
Parents 
Even with the recognition that the court has the judicial authority to 
order that reasonable efforts be made, what exactly is required remains 
largely undefined251 and would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  
Some states have addressed this issue by providing more concrete 
requirements for their child protection agencies to follow when providing 
services.  For example, in Oregon, the efforts to reunify a family must 
have a rational relationship to the reason for the child having been placed 
in state custody.252  A clearer indication of the services required under the 
reasonable efforts requirement would allow for both DCF and the court to 
better evaluate parents’ claims that they are receiving inadequate services.  
Clearer agency policy about what services parents with disabilities are 
guaranteed under the ADA would also help DCF avoid lawsuits and 
investigations and help family defense attorneys advocate for specific 
services on behalf of their clients.  However, lack of clear definition of 
what constitutes reasonable efforts does not eliminate the judicial 
responsibility under Chapter 119, Section 29C, to make written findings 
of reasonable efforts, nor the authority to order that services be provided.  
It is also possible that the definition of reasonable efforts was intended by 
the legislature to remain broad, because a factual determination of whether 
reasonable efforts were made will depend entirely on the unique factual 
circumstances of each case.  Regardless, putting the determination of 
whether reasonable efforts have been made into the hands of the judiciary 
rather than DCF itself would create a necessary check on DCF’s ability to 
take custody of children without providing necessary services for parents. 
CONCLUSION 
The court’s decision in Walt upheld the power of the judiciary to 
make specific orders when DCF has been found in violation of the 
reasonable efforts requirement.253  This decision extends the scope of 
authority held by the juvenile court to include ordering DCF to remedy its 
                                                 
251. O’Brien, supra note 37, at 1054. 
252. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.343(1)(a) (West 2018). 
253. See supra Section III.A. 
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failure to provide reunification services once the child has been 
removed.254  As of now, there is no other meaningful enforcement 
mechanism for ensuring that adequate reunification services are provided, 
and therefore no pressure upon DCF to abide by this statutory 
requirement.255 
The ability to hold the Department accountable for fulfilling its 
statutory obligation is of particular relevance in wake of the Sara Gordon 
case and subsequent DOJ and HSS report.256  For parents with intellectual 
disabilities, or other disabilities protected under the ADA, it is 
fundamental that these clients have a mechanism for timely argument that 
their specific needs be accommodated for by DCF in support of 
reunification.257  Applying Walt to provide more active judicial review of 
services for parents will provide parents with disabilities one way to seek 
review of the services they are being offered, and potential redress for 
inadequate services.  This added avenue of advocacy and protection would 
help families reduce the harm associated with a prolonged and 
unnecessary separation. 
                                                 
254. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 810–811 (Mass. 2017). 
255. See supra Section I.D. 
256. See Robyn Powell, Federal Agencies Say State Cannot Discriminate Against Parents 
with Disabilities, ABA (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/child_law_practice/vol-34/march-
2015/federal-agencies-say-state-cannot-discriminate-against-parents-w/ 
[https://perma.cc/7VGM-P7WQ] (“Regrettably, despite the ADA and Section 504’s obvious 
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